This article presents analysis of air service levels and competition dynamics in the transatlantic market before and after the EU-US Open Skies Agreement (OSA) signed in 2008. By comparing direct and connecting flights in a typical off-peak week, we investigate whether the EU-US OSA has led to more choices for transatlantic travelers. We examine the impact of the EU-US OSA on competition between carriers, alliances, and hub airports. The results show that the number of direct transatlantic connections and served airport pairs decreased and only indirect competition increased.
Introduction
Regulation of civil aviation between the United States and EU member states, the most important intercontinental air-transport market in the world, traditionally has been based on bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) of a relatively protectionist nature. A ruling by the European Court of Justice about nationality clauses of bilateral agreements being against the treaty led, among other things, to negotiations between the United and competition. The analysis considers all scheduled direct and one-stop flights between the European Union and the United States, and vice versa, in a typical off-peak week. In particular, this study overcomes a gap in the literature about the effect of the EU-US OSA, which has previously focused mostly on case studies of the impact on a specific airport.
Impact of Eu-uS oSA Expected Effects of Liberalization
Based on previous deregulation experiences, the EU and US governments expect to benefit from competition and regulatory convergence in air transport. Such expectations have encouraged the liberalization of the EU-US civil aviation area. In the last 20 years, the United States and European Union have been engaged in restructuring their aviation regulations toward a less protectionist approach, which has been deemed a success by the governments. Early deregulation was focused on domestic aviation, and its extension to bilaterals enabled several improvements in the air-transport industry. Both US domestic deregulation and the establishment of the Single European Aviation Market stimulated new and better air services that fostered traffic growth (Goetz 2002; Graham 1998) . Airlines had the chance to optimize their networks, operation efficiency, and boost load factors, which increased cost competitiveness (Oum, Fu, and Yu 2005) and reduced fares in some cases. Finally, improvements in the air-transport industry generated positive externalities in the overall economy and contributed to economic development (InterVISTAS 2006) .
Although positive results have generally been observed in the liberalization of domestic markets, results for liberalized bilateral OSAs has been mixed. For bilateral OSAs, between the United States and several EU countries, overall increase in service levels is detected in only seven out of sixteen cases. In three cases no change is visible, while in other cases the service levels actually decrease (Cosmas, Belobaba, and Swelbar 2010) . Moreover, the increase in capacity between countries signing OSAs seems to be due entirely to the expansion of immunized alliances on the routes between hubs (Whalen 2007 ). Yet, flight ticket prices are decreased to a greater extent in open skies markets.
These contrasting impacts of the bilateral OSAs motivated several studies forecasting the impact of the EU-US OSA. Most early studies on the EU-US OSA predicted benefits for both passenger and air freight (Booz Allen Hamilton 2007; Button 2009; InterVISTAS 2006; Pels 2009 ). 2 For example, they assume that OSAs enhance the airlines' ability to feed transatlantic routes, to coordinate their activities more effectively, and benefit from antitrust immunity granted to alliances. A scenario expected to result in a more efficient air-transport system and an overall reduction in average costs for the airlines. If cost savings are passed on to the passengers, then the OSA is expected to impact fares and increase passenger volumes. 3 In the same way, the cost reduction of cargo services and greater access to air express services may stimulate cargo growth by 1-2 percent in the transatlantic cargo market. Fares are expected to decrease due to more competition and higher flight frequencies by 9-10 percent according to estimates (Peterson and Graham 2008) . However, if the airline response to the EU-US OSA resembles earlier experience airlines will step up alliance agreements. Therefore, increased competition in the intercontinental market will arise mostly from the new entry of carriers with different business models, if able to sustain such models (Pels 2009) .
Besides the direct positive consequences for the aviation sector, many predictive studies identify potential indirect impacts on tourism and catalytic effects from air-service development. In particular, labor market effects are predicted because traffic growth requires additional resources to satisfy the demand, and this need generates employment in the aviation industry and the supporting industries. For example, additional major country-pair markets (United States with United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, and Greece) stemming from the OSA were estimated to contribute 117,000 new jobs (InterVISTAS 2006) . Generally, OSA studies converge around positive impacts on economic prosperity, employment, foreign direct investment, and gross domestic product (GDP), though these impacts are often not well quantified in the studies. Finally, some studies predict higher OSA impact in countries having restrictive ASAs prior to the enactment of the EU-US OSA.
In summary, numerous positive consequences were predicted with the passage of the EU-US OSA, pertaining to competition and additional route offerings. Increased competition may reduce the relative market power of airlines and stimulate more cooperation and coordination of prices and schedules. All of these changes may result in the reduction of costs and fares. Thus, we expect our analysis to highlight improvements in transatlantic air services, such as more connections, and new routes.
Observed Effects of Liberalization
Empirical studies monitoring the international transatlantic civil aviation area are rare and mainly focus on the countries and airports ruled by ASAs until the EU-US OSA. As a result, few insights are available about the actual impact of the EU-US OSA.
The literature indicates that not all of the predicted effects actually occur, and the true impacts appear to be mainly routes changes. In particular, studies report that one year after enactment of the EU-US OSA, routes offered from Ireland to the United States increased from three to ten, and passengers could save time by having more opportunities to fly directly from Dublin (Barrett 2009) . Route changes, which generally target the rationalization of services in London, are also observable in the UK-US segment, as British Airways moved its services from Gatwick to Heathrow, and Air France introduced a daily service between Heathrow and Los Angeles (Morrel and Humphreys 2008) . The substantial expansion of Heathrow is due to the access of US airlines to this airport (Luongo 2010) . Notwithstanding, there is not a significant impact on passenger numbers coming from London, although traffic growth attributable to the EU-US OSA is registered in Amsterdam (Pitfield 2011) . This article seeks to give a comprehensive view of changes in the North Atlantic skies since the passage of the EU-US OSA, thereby filling a gap in the literature.
Data
The empirical analysis highlights changes in service level and competition in the North Atlantic market three years after the OSA. We use OAG's worldwide database of airline schedules and other associated data. 4 The study deals with both nonstop and one-stop scheduled flights from the United States to the European Union and vice versa, using a typical off-peak week as a base, to measure changes that are persistent over time and not the results of on-off additional offers during demand peaks. In particular, we compare data extracted from the schedules of the 46th weeks of 2007 and 2010.
The research consists of two phases, devoted to direct and indirect connections, respectively. The connections are identified using a methodology suggested by Redondi, Malighetti, and Paleari (2011) but focusing only on connecting (one-stop) flights. Indirect connections are identified by combining direct transatlantic flights with nonstop flights inside the United States and direct European domestic flights, such that the connecting time is longer than 45 minutes and the two segments of the flight are carried out either by the same carrier or by members of a global airline alliance. 5 Thus, we exclude "self-connections," that is, transfers between two independent operators arranged by the passengers themselves. The sample of indirect connections is further reduced by restricting the analysis to flights connecting origin-destination (O-D) airport pairs linked in both directions. By assuming that passengers are travel-time sensitive, the analysis of indirect connections concerns only flights whose total travel time is no more than 20 percent longer than the quickest alternative, connecting the same airport pairs, considering both direct and indirect opportunities. 6 Essentially, this analysis drops the alternatives with high routing factor.
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In addition to reflecting passenger behavior, this selection criterion drops connecting paths that have little attractiveness, like connecting EU cities to New York passing through Los Angeles (a one-stop connecting flight).
Results
The description of the empirical results is divided into two sections. The first section describes changes in the transatlantic service level provided by direct connections and changes in competition at the airline and airport levels. The service level between two countries is measured by the volume of supply (number of weekly connections and weekly passenger capacity), and by the wideness of customer choice (number of airport pairs). The dynamics of competition is highlighted by the concentration index (e.g., Gini or Herfindhal index) and by considering the number of players per route. The second section is devoted to connecting flights and shows which changes affect customer choice, connectivity of EU and US cities with transatlantic destinations, competition among carriers, and competition among hub airports.
Direct Connections
Given the symmetry between EU-US direct connections and vice versa, only changes in the supply of US-EU service are shown.
transatlantic Service level: number of Connections and Available Seats
Comparing annual data about passengers of North Atlantic nonstop flights in 2007 and 2010, we observe a decrease in demand that is larger than the observed decrease in the overall US and overall EU international air transport flows. 8 In recent years, the supply of air-transport services on the North Atlantic segment has changed in response to demand characteristics. Consequently, between 2007 and 2010, we observe a decrease of 8 percent in the number of US-EU connections and a decrease of 5.5 percent in the number of available seats on this route. flights is balanced by the enhancement of aircraft capacity (i.e., California, Massachusetts, and Michigan). The greatest negative change is in Ohio, whereas increased connectedness is observed in North Carolina, Texas, and Utah, the latter not being connected to the European Union by nonstop flights in 2007 (see table 2 ). Thus, data on route capacity and flight frequency do not verify the expected impact of the EU-US OSA on transatlantic air services.
Undoubtedly, the net drop of capacity and frequency of flights is partially due to the global economic crisis. Yet, the economic crisis on its own does not provide a complete explanation for the postcrisis dynamics of transatlantic air services. In fact, the gross domestic product trends between 2007 and 2010 are not necessarily correlated with changes in scheduled flights (see table 3 ). Moreover, data on traffic in US and EU domestic markets and in international markets highlight that the negative impact on US-EU connections is higher than on the overall international air transportation and lower than on domestic flights (see tables 4 and 5). Yet, looking at changes in European countries and American states we observe different trends. In particular, Spain and Sweden on the European side, and California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas on the America side, are characterized by higher increase of seat capacity on US-EU flights than in other markets. It has to be noted that the performance of Spain strongly affects the statistics of total EU member states. In fact, if we do not take into account Spain's results, the decrease in the US-EU market amounts to 7.5 percent, close to the EU domestic market reductions. Another explanation of the observed trends can be attributed to the EU-US market maturity. In 2007, before introduction of the EU-US OSA, the supply of transatlantic air services is meeting demand with some evidence of overcapacity. In the absence of a strong reduction in fares, demand and supply would not change distinctly from past trend.
transatlantic Service level: Customer Choice
In addition to the cancellation of nonstop transatlantic connections to/from two European countries (i.e., Hungary and Romania) and to/from two US states (i.e., Connecticut and Maine), customer choice deteriorates in 2010 because of a reduction in the served nonstop city pairs and airport pairs. In 2007, before enactment of the EU-US OSA, 40 European cities are connected by nonstop flights from the United States. However, by 2010, the number of European destinations has dropped to 34. Similarly, the number of city pairs with at least one nonstop connection per week drops from 168 to 155 and the number of airport pairs drops from 197 to 181.
A closer look at nonstop routes highlights that the transatlantic service-level changes because 42 routes are removed, while only 26 new routes are introduced. 10 The United Kingdom is the European country most affected by route changes: 17 US-UK routes are erased, and only 7 new routes are scheduled. The beneficiary of these changes is Heathrow Airport, with 5 new routes for the United States. However, the transatlantic service level is enhanced in Thus, the opportunity to fly from any EU city to any US city and vice versa is not yet widely exploited by US and EU airlines, as testified by changes in the scheduled direct routes. Actual changes in transatlantic service levels vary across EU countries and US states. EU OSA positively affects customer choice only in Spain, among all of the EU countries without past bilateral OSAs with the United States.
Carrier Competition and the Role of Alliances
Contrary to the expected effects of the EU-US OSA, industry competition is reduced. The Gini index increases from 0.690 to 0.764. Thus, in 2010 a greater inequality in the dispersion of seats among destinations characterizes the North Atlantic market.
The number of airlines providing nonstop transatlantic air services decreases from 45 to 33 between 2007 and 2010, due to service interruption by 16 carriers and service introduction by only 4 carriers (Air Berlin, Thomson Airways, Open Skies, and Air Europa). Three of these entrants are driven by replacement aims. Air Berlin entered the transatlantic market after purchasing LTU International, inheriting its routes and, partially, market shares. As a result of the merger of First Choice Airways with Thomsonfly, the new carrier Thomson Airways operates on transatlantic routes instead of First Choice Airways. The new carrier Open Skies was similarly founded in 2008 by British Airways, after the acquisition of L'Avion, to operate between France, Netherlands, and the United States.
The reduction of carriers operating on the North Atlantic is due to the closure of some smaller carriers (i.e., FlyGlobeSpan, SilverJet, Zoom Airlines, EOS airlines) and others already mentioned. Most other carriers that cease to operate in this market (i.e., Air India, BMI, Emirates, Malev Hungary, Malaysia Airlines, Maxjet Airways, Olympic Air, and Czech Airlines) are airlines with a residual market share in the UK-US segment or carriers that operate to/from European countries most affected by drop in the demand (i.e., Hungary, Greece, and Czech Republic). The low profitability of services offered by these carriers has probably discouraged the entry of new players. Moreover, the merger between Northwest and Delta contributes to the reduction of the number of carriers serving US-EU routes but also makes Delta the leader in direct transatlantic air services. In 2010 Delta replaces British Airways in the first position.
Apart from the reduction of the number of carriers operating on the transatlantic, the competition is also reduced because of the strengthening of the market position of major players (see table 6 ). The overall market share of the major players moves from 49.4 to 58.2 percent. Most of this change is due to increasing market share of three players: British Airways, Delta, and Lufthansa. Delta Airlines increased its market share from 9.7 to 15.9 percent thanks to the merger with Northwest and British Airways had an increase from 12.6 to 13.5 percent, while Lufthansa experienced an increase from 9.3 to 10.5 percent. Moreover, we observe a lack of new entry on routes with a predominant player. Entries and exits in the last three years have enhanced the role played by US carriers and reduced the role played by carriers outside the European Union (see table 7 ). Carriers belonging to strategic alliances have also increased their market share. Thus, the market share commanded by airlines in the major strategic alliances moves from 83.7 to 89.6 percent. In 2010, Star Alliance plays a predominant role, thanks to the addition of Continental Airlines to their ranks in addition to a 3 percent increase by other member airlines (see table 8). 
Indirect Connections
With regard to changes in the service level and competition between carriers and alliances, this subsection reports the results of the analysis of US-EU one-stop flights. With regard to indirect flights, there is not a perfect directional symmetry because of differences between domestic US and internal EU flights. This subsection closes with a comprehensive analysis of airport hub operations. The discussion is of interest because of the importance of hub-and-spoke networks in long-haul flights and airline competition dynamics through hubs.
transatlantic Service level
Considering only one-stop connections whose segments are operated by the same carrier or carriers belonging to the same global alliance, in 2010, we observe a drop in airport pairs compared to 2007 (see table 9 ). The supply of indirect air transport services on the transatlantic market sustains a loss of about 10 percent in terms of total O-D pairs. This contraction is mainly caused by the restructuring of indirect services operated by the same carrier, a reduction of 15 percent overall. fig. 1 ).
To explain the changes in the number of indirect flights at the country level, we detect imperfect correlation with changes in direct transatlantic flights and intra-EU air services. Changes in one-stop routes are due to decreasing performances in guaranteeing connection between transatlantic and domestic flights at main hubs.
Analyzing changes in transatlantic air transport services at the US state level provides a similar picture (see fig. 2 ). We observe reduced service levels in most states, which reflect at least partially the contraction of domestic US flights. and transatlantic flights affecting the transatlantic market. The greatest negative impact of reduced coordination is seen in Connecticut, Maine, and Mississippi, whereas West Virginia shows the greatest benefit. At the city level, we observe a reduction in the number of EU cities connected by indirect flights to the United States but an increase in the number of US cities with one-stop connections to the European Union. Among the top-10 EU-connected cities in 2007, we observe a prevailing negative trend in terms of service coverage (i.e., percentage of US cities connected to a specific EU city). Paris, Frankfurt, Brussels, and Madrid show an average increase of 6 percent in US city coverage, but remain exceptions from the general trend. Although London, the most connected city in 2007 and 2010, is reachable from two additional US cities, the gap with other EU cities is narrowing. With regard to US cities, we observe changes of smaller magnitude that generally favor connectivity of cities on the East Coast and hurt cities on the Northwest Coast. Among the top US cities, Miami is characterized by the highest increase in connectivity (see table 10 ).
The quality of service, defined by travel time and flight frequency, is decreased in most of the O-D pairs. About 53 percent of O-D pairs linked both in 2007 and in 2010 by one-stop connections are affected by a decrease of flight frequency or an increase of total travel time (see table 11). In most cases, the increase in travel time is due to a worsening of coordination that causes increased waiting times in hubs. In about 40 percent of cases the increase in travel time is due to higher routing factors. fig. 3 ). This change in predominance is also visible from the extent of monopoly routes by global alliances (see table 13 ).
Competition among Hub Airports
The list of hub airports that play a role in one-stop transatlantic flights changes between 2007 and 2010. This alteration arises from changes in origins and destinations of direct flights (e.g., in 2010 BDL, BGR and BUD cease acting as intermediate airports, while SLC and LCY become hubs for onestop transatlantic connections) and from the different coordination performances of minor hub airports (e.g., GLA ceases as an hub, while SNN and STR become hubs). These alterations result in a reduction of the number of hubs (i.e., from 61 to 58 airports) and changes in the top rankings of the airports in terms of served O-D pairs (see table 14 To address competition, hubs implement different strategies (see table 15 ). Half of the airports seek to improve coordination performance to guarantee lower waiting time, whereas a few seek to enhance the number of connections to offer higher flight frequencies. In particular, some airports, such as Stockholm Arlanda (ARN), Bruxelles (BRU), and Copenhagen (CPH), improve the quality of connections both by reducing waiting times and by enhancing flight frequencies. Some airports, such as New York JFK and Atlanta, enhance only flight frequencies and others, such as Athens (ATH), Dallas (DFW), and Boston (MIA), enhance only temporal coordination.
Conclusion
This article seeks to identify whether changes in north transatlantic airtransport services after the EU-US OSA came into force have been consistent with expectations about competition and service levels. The results show a decrease in both direct and one-stop connections and fewer O-D pairs. This is due to removal of routes served in the past, with only partial replacement by new ones. Thus, customer choice has deteriorated, post EU-US OSA. Considering the number of cities linked by nonstop and one-stop flights, the analysis highlights contrasting trends between the European Union and the United States. In particular, we see greater dispersion of transatlantic services in the United States and contraction of services in the European Union, although the changes differ across European countries and American states. On the EU side, these different trends are not correlated with different regulations in force before the EU-US OSA. In particular, a similar impact is not observed in countries without previous bilateral OSAs with the United States (i.e., United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Hungary). Among those, Spain is the only country showing a positive effect. In fact, the positive impact on Ireland suggested by Barrett (2009) is not confirmed.
Competition between carriers in supplying direct transatlantic flights has decreased because of fewer players and consolidation of market shares. Moreover, a lack of new entry on routes with a predominant player was observed. For one-stop flights increased competition occurs on routes that were served by only one carrier in 2007. Coordination within alliances is enhanced and competition among hub airports increased in 2010. EU airports increased their ranking among the world's top-10 hubs, due to improved quality of services. The difficulty in operating a long-haul low cost business model and the presence of entry barriers for new players related to slot allocation, contributes, among other things, to the unexpected impact of the EU-USA OSA. Our results show that the economic crisis has reduced market demand for the US-EU market by 14.1 percent, probably the key reason why opportunities provided by the EU-US OSA have not been fully exploited.
The impact of EU-US OSA is also lower because of the lack of new players that have shaped the competition in the intra-EU and domestic US markets. The traditional low-cost business model does not seem fit well with longhaul flights. Cost advantages of the low-cost model applied to long-haul are not as important as in short-haul (Francis et al. 2007 features characterizing low-cost carriers are not adequate for long-haul passengers' needs that are sensitive not only to price but also to on-flight services, timing, and routing. Furthermore the entry of new players is hampered by grandfather rights and unavailability of slots in most key hub airports. Concerning the impact of the EU-US OSA, some questions remain. In particular, since our analysis highlights changes in the supply of airtransport services and on industry concentration, future research could investigate fare dynamics in order to understand better the price/quality trade-off relationship and the effect of competition. Notes 7. Routing factor is the ratio between the distance flown to complete the connection and the direct "as the crow flies" distance between origin and destination. 8. Compound annual growth rate of EU-US passengers is −4.9 percent vs. −0.6 percent for EU international passengers and −3 percent for US international travelers. 9. Load factor of EU-US flights is almost the same (more or less 80%) in the last 10 years. 10. Maps covering new and eliminated direct routes are available on request. 11. Changes in the number of O-D pairs per European country and American state are available on request. 12. The analysis of indirect competition is carried out on global alliance level since their relevance in coordinating carriers' scheduling to provide one-stop flights. Consequently, the count of players on a route considers carriers competing only if they belong to different alliances or are not related to any alliance. 13. The increase of routes served by more than one player is confirmed also after controlling for the effect of membership's change of Continental Airlines.
